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WISCONSIN SMALL CLAIMS PRACTICE
UNDER CH. 299: A DISCUSSION AND
SOME SUGGESTIONS
ROBERT F. BODEN*
INTRODUCTION
Wisconsin lawyers have now been living with Chapter 299 of the
Statutes, the small claims act born of court reorganization, for almost
two years, and perhaps the time is now ripe to review its workings. As
this is written, the 1963 Legislature is in session and there are numer-
ous bills, notably the corrective measures of the Judicial Council, now
pending which would amend the chapter. These will be discussed and
further suggestions for amendment will be made.
It is not the purpose of this article to discuss Ch. 299 practice in
every detail; nor is it concerned in any way with the incidental areas
of its application, that is, in forfeiture, unlawful detainer and replevin
actions. Our concern is with Ch. 299 as a workable tool in small claims
damage actions.
SMALL CLAIMS AND COURT REORGANIZATION
Court reorganization gave us a reasonably uniform system of coun-
ty courts with civil jurisdiction.1 In the absence of a special statute to
govern small claims matters, the rules of pleading and practice set
forth in Title XXV of the Statutes, so-called "circuit court practice,"
would apply in every county court, because such court is a court of
record.2 The abolition of the many municipal and inferior courts left
no forum for small claims other than justice courts. The obvious need
existed for an expeditious inexpensive method of disposing of small
claims. When the Judicial Council began its consideration of the prob-
lem, there existed in Wisconsin law three models of such procedure.
They were:
Justice Court Procedure. As old as the state, and governed by Title
XXVIII of the Statutes,3 this procedure was essentially applicable to
courts not of record, but did contain certain features recommended by
long experience to any small claims procedure, among them being a day
certain for return of the summons, physical appearance on that day,
informal pleading, early trial, etc. Among the features of justice court
practice not recommended for small caims handling in a court of record
*Assistant Professor of Law and Director of Continuing Legal Education,
Marquette University; member of the Wisconsin Bar; member of the Wis-
consin Judicial Council.
1 Wis. STAT. ch. 253 (1961).
2 WIs. STAT. §253.01 (1961).
3 Wis. STAT. chs. 300-309 (1961).
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was the concept of trial de novo on appeal. Since court reorganization
removed from the justices jurisdiction in garnishment and attachment,4
as a practical matter the use of these courts in most small claims actions
was virtually eliminated, requiring a county court act that would, gen-
erally speaking, adapt to a court of record the general scheme of justice
court practice, with refinements as necessary.
Small Claims Procedure Under Old Ch. 254. This pre-court reor-
ganization chapter provided for small claims courts of record at county
board option in all counties except Milwaukee. Summary proceedings
were the rule under this chapter, which incorporated many justice
court concepts, and contained some short-cut and expense-reducing in-
novations, as service of process by the clerk and by mail.5 Many of
these provisions have found their way into Ch. 299. The Small Claims
Court of Dane County, the workings of which were viewed with alarm
by many non-Madison lawyers, was the model of this type of court.
Milwaukee Civil Court Procedure. This curious, yet highly work-
able, procedure obtained in the old Milwaukee County Civil Court." It
was built upon a dual system, in general, but only in general, adopting
circuit court practice to matters over $200 and justice court practice to
matters under $200, with the necessary refinements to accomodate a
court of record. The exceptions to this division were numerous, and the
whole practice baffled out-state lawyers. But once a lawyer learned
Civil Court practice in all of its complexity, one thing became apparent
-for Milwaukee County at least, it worked. Whether this could be said
state-wide was another matter, but quite naturally Milwaukee lawyers
tried to get, and in certain areas succeeded in getting, some Civil Court
provisions into Ch. 299.
In this climate the Judicial Council produced the basic plan of small
claims practice. In the latter days of the 1961 Legislature, the Coun-
cil's proposal was buffeted around, amended and re-amended, until
there emerged Ch. 299, entitled "Procedure in County Court in Small
Claims Type Actions.' '7 As it exists today it represents a compromise
4 Wis. STAT. §300.06(5) (1961).
5 The justice practice basis of old ch. 254 is apparent, but Wis. STAT. §254.07(1)
(1959) contained the express directive (not found in new ch. 299) that the
"practice and procedure of said small claims court shall be summary in na-
ture." Mail service by the clerk was authorized by Wis. STAT. §254.11(2)
(1959).6 Created as a municipal court by Wis. LAWS 1909, ch. 549. Amendments
thereto, until 1951, amended that chapter. By Wis. LAws, 1951, ch. 168, the
Civil Court Act was reenacted, as amended, and as printed in the 1950 Wis-
consin Annotations. Wis. LAWS, 1953, ch. 493, raised the status of the court
from municipal to inferior, according it state-wide jurisdiction except in
matters under $200. A separate act, Wis. LAws 1921, ch. 538, organized a
small claims branch of Civil Court for matters not exceeding $50. As amended,
it was reenacted in similar fashion by Wis. LAWS 1951, ch. 169.
7 The principal sources of ch. 299 as printed in the 1961 Statutes were Wis.
LAWS 1961, chs. 519, 614, 618, and 643.
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between two schools of thought on the subject of small claims handling:
(1) the advocates of a thoroughly informal, almost administrative type
process; and (2) the proponents of an essentially judicial approach,
with exceptions to circuit court practice as dictated by necessity. The
result is a hybrid, but not, as some have alleged, a hodge-podge. That
Ch. 299 was not enacted by acclamation in the form originally proposed
indicates that it must contain "bugs" and contradictions requiring
amendment.
SMALL CLAIMS PRACTICE UNDER CHAPTER 299
Besides governing forfeiture, unlawful detainer and replevin actions
in county court, the Act applies to all damage actions involving $500
or less.s The chapter is designed as an exception to the general rule that
Title XXV or "circuit court" practice applies in civil actions in county
court, and, therefore, in all instances where Ch. 299 does not provide a
rule of procedure, circuit court practice governs.9 An outline of practice
in county court small claims actions then proceeds upon the differences
or exceptions to basic circuit court practice as contained in Ch. 299.
A. THE SUMMONS AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION
1. The Summons. As in justice, old small claims and Civil court
practice, the summons required to commence an action is (1) issued by
the clerk, and (2) returnable on a day and at a time certain.' 0 It must
be returnable not less than 8 nor more than 17 days from its issue date,
and it must be served not less than 8 days prior to the return date."
The form of the summons may be found in §299.05. Conforming to
the scheme that pleadings may be oral, 2 the summons must state the
nature of the action, substantially in the general terms of §299.01,
which sets forth the types of cases to which the Act applies. Some
courts have made printed forms available, and they may be purchased
for $3 apiece in blank, this being the combined charge for suit tax and
clerk's fee.1
3
2. Service of Summons; Personal furisdiction. The Act provides
that jurisdiction of the person may be obtained by two types of service:
(1) by mail ;14 and (2) by personal or substituted service.' 5 Service by
mail is an innovation to lawyers not familiar with old Ch. 254. The
summons and sufficient copies are left with the clerk, who collects a 50c
fee for mailing.' The court by rule may require the use of registered
8 WIs. STAT. §299.01 (4) (1961).
9 WIS. STAT. §299.04 (1961).
10 Wis. STAT. §299.05 (1961).
II Wis. STAT. §299.05 (3) (1961).
12 WIS. STAT. §299.06 (1961).
13 Wis. STAT. §299.08 (1961).
- WIs. STAT. §299.13 (1) (1961).
'5 WIS. STAT. §299.13(2) (1961).
36 WIs. STAT. §299..13(1) (1961).
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mail,'1 7 and service is considered complete upon mailing, unless the en-
velope is returned unopened to the clerk before the return day.' s Local
option by court rule to eliminate mail service and require all service to
be personal or substituted is provided, and has been exercised by the
County Courts of Milwaukee, Racine, Kenosha, Waukesha, Ozaukee,
Dodge and Washington Counties.'9
Under §299.14, a procedure is provided for reopening default judg-
ments (or otherwise permitting defense where judgment has not been
entered) in the case of failure of actual notice by mail. Defendant must
petition the court "within 15 days of receiving actual knowledge of the
pendency of the action or of the entry of judgment therein against him"
and the court has discretion to reopen. An appearance and submission
to the court's jurisdiction without so moving waives the right to re-
open.2
0
The great volume of cases in Milwaukee County and the other
populous counties of the southeastern part of the state immediately sug-
gested that service by mail would be unworkable for the great number
of reopening petitions that would be brought, and the court rule abolish-
ing mail service in the seven southeastern counties resulted. 21
Personal service is authorized and, with the exceptions discussed be-
low, is governed by §299.13(2). Service by publication, except as to in
rem or quasi-in rem actions governed by §299.16, is prohibited.
3. Limitations on Personal Jurisdiction. Preserving to some extent
the concept that territorial jurisdiction should be limited in small cases,
the Act, in §299.12, sets up a complex triple standard prescribing the
limits of personal jurisdiction, doing so in terms of the type of service
used and the amount involved. The entire test must be qualified by
§299.11, which places a territorial limit on personal service.
Where service is by mail under §299.13(1) the statute provides 22
that jurisdiction of the person is obtained only: (1) when the defend-
ant, at the commencement of the action, is a natural person present in
the county when served, or having his usual place of abode in the conn-
ty, or is a corporation or unincorporated association or member of a
partnership engaged in substantial business in the county; or (2) when
17 Ibid. In such case, the clerk's fee is increased to $1.50. The term "registered
mail" includes certified mail, subject to the limitations of Wis. STAT. §990.001-
(13) (1961).
Is Ibid.
19 Rule 3 of the Rules of County Court, Civil Division, Small Claims. The rules
of court established for the seven southeastern counties named have been printed
and distributed to attorneys by the Milwaukee Bar Association. Several of
the important rules are alluded to throughout this article. Unfortunately, the
rules as published are unnumbered. The author, therefore, has taken the
liberty of numbering them consecutively for purposes of reference herein.
20 WIs. STAT. §299.14(2) (1961).
21 Supra note 19.
22 Wis. STAT. §299.12(1) (1961).
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the action, regardless of defendant's domicile, arises out of the use or
operation of a motor vehicle in the county.
This would suggest that mail service must be within the county, ex-
cept for domiciliaries of the county and non-resident motorists, but
§299.11 provides in part:
Service of process by mail in actions under this chapter to
obtain a judgment against a party personally shall be limited to
the territorial limits of the county....
As discussed hereafter, this renders the non-resident motorist provision
meaningless, 23 but in addition and in general limits mail service to the
county.
Where personal service is had under §299.13(2), the jurisdiction of
the court over the defendant's person depends upon the amount in-
volved. Preserving a distinction in the old Milwaukee Civil Court Act24
which limited the court's jurisdiction to the county in matters within
justice court jurisdiction, but which accorded state-wide jurisdiction in
matters over $200, an amendment to the original bill now limits juris-
diction of the person in matters $200 or less to the county (expressed
in the same terms as the mail-service limits described above), but in
matters over $200 jurisdiction is state-wide.2 5 §299.11 again modifies
these rules by providing that in matters "involving $200 or more" (note
the different treatment of the $200-even case) personal service to obtain
a personal judgment "may be made outside the county but within the
state." From this it probably must be inferred that: (1) in matters un-
der $200 personal service must be made within the county; (2) in $200-
even matters the court's jurisdiction is county-wide, but its process is
state-wide; and (3) despite the provision in §299.13(2) that service on
a natural person may be made in any manner authorized by §262.06(1)
(a) or (b), or (2), personal service cannot be made outside the state.
The matter is further confused by the express provisions in §299.13 (2)
purporting to authorize personal service on a corporation by serving its
officers, agents, etc., anywhere in the state, and the seemingly contrary
limits of §299.11 with respect to service outside the county in matters
involving less than $200.
4. Non-Resident Motorist Cases. The limitations on jurisdiction of
the person have, as indicated above, ousted the county court of jurisdic-
tion over non-resident motorists, unless service is accomplished as upon
any other defendant. §345.09 permits service of process against non-
23 In addition, WIS. STAT. §299.11 (1961), provides that the general non-resident
motorist statute, §345.09, does not apply, and personal service, by implication
from §299.11 is limited to the state, except in matters under $200, where it
is apparently limited to the county. See discussion, infra.
24Wis. LAWS 1953, ch. 493, amending §5.1 of the Civil Court Act, Wis. LAWS
1951, ch. 168.
25 WIs. STAT. §299.12(2) (1961).
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resident motorists upon the motor vehicle commissioner, who then noti-
fies the defendant by mail. §299.11 provides that this statute does not
apply to small claims actions. The obvious substitute would be direct
mail service upon the non-resident, eliminating the necessity of the
middle-man commissioner, and §299.12(1) (b) is actually written in
terms that indicate an intention to permit such service in providing that
jurisdiction of the person may be acquired where service is by mail
"when the action regardless of defendant's domicile arises out of the use
or operation of a motor vehicle in the county." (emphasis added) But
§299.11 effectively eliminates service by mail upon non-resident motor-
ists by its provision that mail service is limited to "the territorial limits
of the county." Thus Wisconsin has the curoius policy that its residents
with small claims must be put to more expensive circuit court proceed-
ings and that non-residents may enjoy practical immunity from suit,
but only in county court.
5. Present Status of Personal Jurisdiction Sections. An analysis of
§ §299.11, 299.12 and 299.13 discloses that about one half of the verbage
in those sections is not law at all, because contradicted and modified by
other language in the sections. It would seem that what the sections
mean to say is simply this: In all cases where service by mail, and
where it is personal in cases $200 or less, small claims jurisdiction ex-
tends to natural persons present in the county when served or having
their usual place of abode there, and to business entities and partners
engaged in substantial business in the county, and service must be had
upon such persons within the county to obtain a personal judgment, ex-
cept for the $200-even case, where personal service may be had state-
wide (this exception being simply a fluke) ; in all other cases jurisdiction
is state wide, and service must be had within the state to obtain a per-
sonal judgment.
6. The Venue Problem. It is to be noted that in the $200-$500 cate-
gory of small claims cases, jurisdiction is state-wide. A Kenosha County
creditor could sue a Douglas County debtor for $201 in the Kenosha
County Court, serve the debtor in Douglas County, and thereby obtain
jurisdiction of his person, just as he could do in Circuit Court. Ch. 299
is silent on venue, so the Ch. 261 provisions of Title XXV apply.2 6 The
debtor's only remedy would be a change of venue to Douglas County.
In the short time that Ch. 299 has been in operation, it is apparent that
there has been some abuse of these liberal jurisdictional provisions,
precisely in the manner described above.
Of course it may be argued that the creditor could proceed in similar
fashion in circuit court, as indeed he could; but in this writer's judg-
ment that does not answer the problem-it simply poses another. We
26 Wis. STAT. §299.04(1) (1961).
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cannot discuss here any amendment of circuit court practice rules. The
great danger of venue abuse arising under Ch. 299 is that we are deal-
ing with a type of case where the amount involved is not great, where
the defendant may not seek counsel, and where proceedings are sum-
mary. Consider alone the proposal before the legislature to limit the
time for reopening default judgments taken under Ch. 299 to 90 days,
discussed below, and it is apparent that a different problem exists in
county than in circuit court.
The answer, however, does not seem to be in restricting all small
claims jurisdiction of the county court to the county. There is a great
deal of merit in the flexibility that permits a Waukesha County debtor
to be sued in Milwaukee County, for instance, and the venue abuse
really arises ony when considerable distances are involved or when very
little money is at stake. Traditionally, we have made venue jurisdictional
only in actions involving real estate, and we consider proper venue as
waived when the defendant does not object.2 7
However, in the type case under consideration, waiver probably
should not be presumed from silence-silence in many cases arising
from the ignorance of the defendant, his disbelief in the validity of
proceedings against him in a distant county, his failure to employ coun-
sel, etc. And the plaintiff who has chosen a forum inconvenient for the
defendant should not be heard to complain if the defendant is given
another chance to break his silence. Therefore, one suggestion for a
cure might be a provision in Ch. 299 of the following tenor:
When in any action under this chapter it shall appear from
the return of service of the summons or otherwise that the coun-
ty in which the action is pending is not a proper place of trial
of such action under the provisions of §261.01, the court shall,
on the return day of the summons, adjourn the action to a day
certain not less than 14 nor more than 21 days from such return
date, unless the defendant shall have appeared in the action on
or before the return date. No default judgment shall be entered
in such action unless the plaintiff shall, at least 7 days prior to
the adjourned return date, serve upon the defendant and file a
notice in writing directed to the defendant and advising him of
the pendency of the action; the jurisdiction of the court; his right
to a change of venue to a proper place of trial, naming it or
them; and the adjourned return date. Such notice shall be served
in the manner prescribed by this chapter for the service of a
summons. It shall not be served prior to the original return date.
On the adjourned return date of such action, the court shall
consider any request by the defendant for a change of the place
of trial as a motion for change of venue, whether such request
be oral or written, or made to the court or to the plaintiff. An
order for change of venue hereunder shall direct the plaintiff to
accomplish the change in acordance with §261.10. No default
27 WIs. STAT. §§261.01 (1), 261.03 (1961).
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judgment shall be entered upon such adjourned return date for
the failure of the defendant to appear or respond to such notice
unless the plaintiff or his attorney shall make and file an affidavit
that no request for change of venue was received from the de-
fendant.
A statute of this type might deter considerably the deliberate choice of
wrong venue, would give the defendant a second chance, and at the
same time would preserve the flexibility in extended county court small
claims jurisdiction. The penalty for not accomplishing the change after
order would be dismissal of the action after six months under §299.225,
discussed below.
Another alternative, of course, would be to give the court discretion
to change venue on its own motion, but this solution might not be pro-
ductive of uniformity among county courts. Other possible solutions
might be to extend the time for reopening a default taken in the wrong
venue, to require notice and opportunity to reopen before collection at-
tempts, etc. All of these seem to tend to destroy the finality of the
judgment, however, and it is recommended that protection be afforded
the defendant before judgment is entered.
7. Recommended Amendments in Personal Jurisdiction Provisions.
If we assume a solution to the venue problem along the lines suggested
above, then the very closely related personal jurisdiction question re-
solves itself into the following issues: (a) Should personal jurisdiction
be limited to the county in mail service cases and in all cases $200 or
less? (b) Should non-resident motorists be amendable to suit in small
claims by mail service? (c) Should the language of §§299.11, 299.12
and 299.13 be clarified?
For some reason we trust the post office to make local deliveries but
not out-of-county or out-of-state deliveries. There is less logic to so
limiting mail service than there is to the jurisdictional limit of over
$200 on the state-wide jurisdiction of the court in personal service
cases, but both are to some extent artificial. However, it does seem that
there should be some cut-off in terms of the "smallness" of a claim be-
low which defendant need not be concerned with the prospect of de-
fense, or even of venue change motion, in a distant county. As much
as we might regret the creation of a separate class of "small small
claims," it is probably proper to limit the jurisdiction of the court to the
county in these small cases. And if the legisuature does not trust the
post office department to carry the mail over county lines (except when
process is being mailed to the sheriff for local service), it is probably
simply a curiosity which should not be of great concern.
The real problems in this area are in the non-resident motorist cases
and in the utter confusion of language in the three jurisdiction sections.
Certainly a Wisconsin plaintiff with a small claim against a non-resi-
1963]
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dent motorist should be accorded the facilities of the county court for
disposition thereof, and it should make little difference that the hand
dropping the letter containing the summons into the mailbox is that of
the clerk of court rather than the motor vehicle commissioner. Assum-
ing, therefore, that jurisdiction should be extended in this department,
let us examine the jurisdictional provisions of §§299.11, 299.12 and
299.13.
In the final analysis, what these sections do is lift all of the material
on jurisdiction of the person and service methods out of Ch. 262, mak-
ing certain exceptions, to wit: (a) county-wide jurisdictional limit in
mail service and $200 or less cases; (b) abolition of service outside the
state; (c) abolition of mail service on non-resident motorists. It is in
restating this material that confusion occurs. Because all of Ch. 299 is
an exception to Title XXV, it would seem that there is no real need
for this restatement. Why could not all three sections be replaced by
one section consisting merely of the exceptions and the addition of the
new concept of mail service? Such a section is herewith proposed, and
it makes no changes in the law except to eliminate the special treatment
of the $200-even case and to authorize direct mail service on non-resi-
dent motorists, wherever they may reside.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, all provi-
sions of Title XXV with respect to jurisdiction of the persons
of defendants, the procedure of commencing civil actions, and
the mode and manner of service of process, shall apply to actions
and proceedings under this chapter.
(2) In all matters involving $200 or less, personal service of
process to obtain a personal judgment must be made within the
county where the action is commenced. In all other actions, such
service to obtain such judgment must be made within the state.
Except as provided in §299.16, there shall bie no service b publi-
cation. §345.09 shall not apply to actions under this chapter.
(3) As an alternative to service of process in accordance with
sub. (1) and (2) hereof, the summons may be served upon any
of the defendants by mailing in the manner following: ... (copy-
ing the mailing procedure in the present statute) .... Except as
to actions against non-resident motorists, service by mail to obtain
a personal judgment shall be limited to the territorial limits of the
county where the action is commenced.
(4) Jurisdiction over a person in a matter involving $200 or
less or in any action where the defendant is served pursuant to
sub. (3) may be obtained only when the defendant at the time
the summons is served . . . (copying the present language of
§299.12 limiting personal jurisdiction to the county) . . .; pro-
vided that when the action, arises out of the use or operation of a
motor vehicle in the county, the court shall have jurisdiction of
the person of the defendant upon service pursuant ot sub. (3)
regardless of the domicile of the defendant.
[Vol. 47
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(5) Except as to actions against non-resident motorists, any
county court may by rule require that service of the summons
in some or all actions be made as prescribed in sub. (1) and (2).
B. IN REM JURISDICTION; GARNISHMENT; ATTACHMENT
With minor exceptions, circuit court garnishment and attachment
practice applies under Ch. 299.28 §299.16 provides the machinery for
adjournment and publication where the court has jurisdiction of the
res but not of the defendant personally. Court rules in the seven south-
eastern counties have to some extent amplified the practice.29
It is considered by many that a more simplified procedure should
be available in small claims matters. For example, under justice and
Civil court practiceo a formal garnishee complaint was not required;
a simple affidavit might be filed and the summons alone served. A for-
mal judgment against a defaulting garnishee did not have to be entered 3
as now required by §27.10. It is commonly known that the garnishment
statutes are in need of revision. Any such project should consider not
only the substantive but also the procedural aspects of that problem.
28 Wis. STAT. §299.01(4) (b) (1961). By express provision in the cited section,
§266.09 (alias writs of attachment to the sheriffs of different counties), §267.01(2) (providing for garnishment procedure to be the same as civil action proce-
dure in circuit court), and §267.16 (interpleader in garnishment cases) do not
apply in small claims cases in county court, except that §267.16 applies to
natural persons having their usual place of abode within the county and to
business entities and partners engaged in substantial business activities within
the county. In other respects ch. 266 and ch. 267 practice applies with the
general modifications imposed by ch. 299.
29 The following Rules of County Court, Civil Division, Small Claims, should
be noted:
Rule 11(1) requires a copy of the garnishee summons and complaint to
be filed with the clerk prior to the issuance of the summons for service.
Rule 11(1) (A) provides a form of garnishee summons and answer. The
courts make printed forms available, issued in blank, upon payment of the
filing fee and suit tax of $3.
Rule 11(1) (B) governs the content of garnishee releases and requires
them to bear the title of the action, the case number and return date, the
amount to be paid, if any, and to whom, language releasing the garnishee,
signature by the party or his attorney. They must be directed to the garnishee
and be submitted to the court in duplicate for approval, signature and filing.
The rule restates the old Civil Court practice.
Rule 11(1) (C) provides that orders to garnishee shall be substantially
in the same form as releases, shall be signed by the court or clerk, and need
not be signed by the parties.
Rule 11(1) (D) restricts disbursement of moneys paid into court and
requires an order for the same.
Rule 11(1) (E) restates the provision in §27.3 of the old Civil Court
Act requiring a bond for the disbursement of monies paid into court by
garnishees in cases where the principal defendant has been served by publi-
cation only and has defaulted. Query whether this rule is authorized by any
provision of chs. 267 or 299.
Rule 12 relates to the mechanics of noting adjournment for publication
under §299.16.
0 Wis. STAT. §304.20 (1959) (justice court); Wis. LAws 1951, ch. 168, §27.10
(Civil Court).
31 Wis. STAT. §304.34 (1959) (justice court); Wis. LAws 1951, ch. 168, §27.4
(Civil Court).
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C. PLEADINGS
The act provides 32 that pleadings may be oral or written, following
justice and old Ch. 254 practice. The notation on the summons takes
the place of a written complaint in telling the defendant why he is
being sued. Court rules requiring written and verified pleadings are
authorized,3 3 and the courts of the seven southeastern counties have by
rule required written and verified pleadings in all cases. 34 It was felt
in Milwaukee County at least that permitting oral pleading on the re-
turn day, with the large calendar, would lead only to chaos and confu-
sion.
D. TRIALS
1. In General. Unless a 12- or 6-man jury is demanded, it is waived
and trial is to the court.3 5 Defendant of right may have a seven day
adjournment beyond the return day, and the court has discretion to give
a longer time. 6 The theory of the statute, as with most small claims
acts, is to discourage jury trials, and substantial extra jury fees are
charged.3 7 12 -man jury cases are tried under Title XXV procedure in
county court, or may be transferred to circuit court for trial.3, After
jury selection, 6-man jury cases are also tried under Title XXV pro-
cedure.3 9
2. 6-Man Jury Selection. As originally proposed, the scheme of 6-
man jury selection contemplated for state-wide adoption the old justice
court method of jury selection; that is, the picking of a jury in advance
of trial without the presence of the jury panel and without voir dire
examination or challenges for cause, from a local and not a county
wide panel. Peremptory challenges are simply made from a list, and the
sheriff or constable rounds up those not stricken to sit as a jury. Mil-
waukee attorneys opposed this plan as unworkable in a large city, and
rightly so. The result was the provision in §299.21(6) and (7) that 6-
man juries be selected in the manner provided by §957.054, but that in
Milwaukee County juries be drawn from the circuit court panel regard-
less of the juryman's residence. The concession to the Milwaukee prob-
lem was satisfactory, but the use of §957.054 practice for selecting 6-
man juries in civil cases left considerable to be desired. The section
governs jury selection in criminal cases. It provides for a panel of 18,
from which the state and the defendant each strike 6 names, leaving a
jury of 6. Except in Milwaukee County, no voir dire or challenge for
32 WIs. STAT. §299.06(1) (1961).
3 Ibid.
34 Rule 7, Rules of County Court, Civil Division, Small Claims.
35 WIs. STAT. §299.21 (1961).
36 Wis. STAT. §299.27 (1961).
37 WIS. STAT. §299.21 (1961).
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
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cause is permitted and jurors may all be residents of the municipality
in which the court sits (selected from a municipal jury list), unless de-
fendant demands a county-wide jury.
Section 957.054 does not fit civil cases because: (1) No provision is
made for the case with more than two parties where additional parties
may be entitled to separate peremptory challenges; (2) -Only the def end-
ant is entitled to demand a county-wide jury; and (3) It would seem that
providing six strikes in a civil case was unnecessary (not a problem
out-of-state where picking is from a list, but a real problem in Milwau-
kee where the panel must attend).
A committee of Milwaukee lawyers presented a bill4 0 to the 1963
legislature to cure this problem, and unfortunately it has muddied the
waters considerably. It does remove 6-man jury selection in civil cases
from the criminal section, and it rewrites §299.21 to accomplish this
purpose. Much of the restatement is proper and clarifies that section,
but in dealing with 6-man juries it (1) reduces the number of per-
emptories to two per party and (2) eliminates the municipal jury list.
The result is that parties united in interest (i.e., an insurance company
and its assured) each get two strikes; and the jury itself must always
be drawn in every county from a county-wide panel, a hardship in large,
sparsely settled counties. A good feature of the bill4 is a provision that
the size of the jury panel be determined by adding 8 to the number of
peremptories to be accorded, leaving after strikes are taken a panel of
8 from which the sheriff may summon any 6 he can find, in this manner
lessening the impossibility of trial due to an absent juror.
But the proposed new §299.21, insofar as its provisions for 6-man
juries are concerned, is badly lacking and should be amended in the
particulars discussed above. What everybody seems to want, but what
nobody has yet expressed, is a system of selection in this area which
will give Milwaukee Title XXV jury selection in both 6- and 12-man
cases and the rest of the state a justice practice in 6-man cases. No vio-
lence will be done to the principle of uniformity beyond that already
in the law if we simply say so, instead of trying to work exceptions
into the justice court setup which in effect provide circuit court selec-
tion procedure for Milwaukee.
The attempt to reduce the number of peremptories from 6 to 2 is
important only where the panel must be in physical attendance for voir
dire, again in Milwaukee. Therefore it would seem that, with the Mil-
waukee problem answered by reference to Title XXV, the rest of the
state could be nicely taken care of by lifting existing §957.054 practice
into §299.21, with exceptions dealing with the right of both parties to a
40 Wis. LAws, 1963 Session, Bill No. 261-S.
41 And also of a Judicial Council proposal not at this writing passed, but being
1963 Session, Bill No. 472-S and relating to a similar change in §957.054.
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county-wide jury and the size of the panel in multi-party cases. Lan-
guage such as the following, by way of amendment to §299.21 as pro-
posed to the 1963 legislature, would accomplish such purpose:
If a six-man jury is demandad, no voir dire examination or
challenge for cause shall be permitted, except in counties having
a population of 500,000 or more, where all juries shall be drawn
from the circuit court jury panel and selected in accordance with
the procedure set forth in Title XXV hereof. In all other coun-
ties, such juries shall be selected as provided in §957.054, except
that any party may demand trial by a county-wide jury and that
the clerk shall select, by lot, the names of sufficient persons quali-
fied to serve as jurors as will provide to each party entitled to
separate peremptory challenges the number of challenges speci-
fied in §957.054.
E. FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS
1. Necessity of Written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Because Title XXV practice applies where Ch. 299 is silent,42 it appears
that Ch. 299 as originally enacted required the small claims judge to ob-
serve in every case the provisions of §270.33 and to give his decision in
writing within 60 days of submission, stating separately the findings of
fact and conclusions of law. This, of course, was simply not done in
most small claims cases. Lawyers do not want to be burdened with
drawing detailed findings and conclusions in such cases; judges want to
be able to rule from the bench; and the rule does not seem to be at all
necessary in small cases. Therefore, the 1963 legislature passed a bill
creating §299.21543 taking small claims cases out of the general rule
and providing that in those actions the judge shall state separately the
facts found and the conclusions of law, but that this may be done "orally
immediately following the trial or in writing and filed with the clerk
within 60 days after submission of the cause."
2. Judgments; In General. Default judgments may be entered before
the clerk in contract actions upon filing a written and verified com-
plaint. 44 Other defaults must be proved before the court.45 A plaintiff
defaulting on the return day may have his action dismissed.4 6 All judg-
ments are entered by the clerk in the case docket automatically and
without counsel having to prepare a written formal judgment, and he
must give written notice of entry, except in municipal and county for-
feiture actions.41
42 Wis. STAT. §299.04(1) (1961).
43 Wis. LAWS 1963, ch. 37.
44 WIS. STAT. §299.22(3) (1961).
45 WIS. STAT. §299.22(2) (1961).4 6 WIS. STAT. §299.22(1) (1961).
4 WIs. STAT. §299.24 (1961), as amended by Supreme Court rule, 14 Wis.2d
vii, effective September 1, 1962. The Supreme Court, upon recommendation
of the Judicial Council, relieved the clerk of the duty of giving like notice of
entry of orders and struck the reference in §299.24 to "appealable orders"
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3. Judgment Liens; Docketing Practice. §299.24 governs the doc-
keting of small claims judgments and the manner in which they become
liens on real estate under §270.79. Under the old practice out-state, the
clerk of circuit court maintained a single judgment docket for the coun-
ty, and transcripts of the judgments of inferior, municipal and justice
courts were docketed therein to provide liens upon real estate.4 8 Under
the old Milwaukee Civil Court Act40 the court maintained its own judg-
ment docket, and Civil Court judgments became liens upon docketing
therein.50 The system resulted in two judgment dockets for Milwaukee
County. The original Judicial Council proposal for small claims proce-
dure adopted the out-state system, and for two reasons: (1) the Mil-
waukee system was considered unnecessarily duplicative, requiring
double checking by abstracters and others; and (2) it was believed that
small judgments should not, without overt action by the creditor (filing
a transcript) become liens on real estate.
Section 299.24 was enacted, but with some confusing amendments de-
signed to preserve the Milwaukee system. §299.24(1) provides for entry
of the judgment in the case (not to be confused with judgment) docket
in county court. The case docket, a chronological record of the pro-
ceedings, is required by §299.10, but it is not a judgment docket, and
mere entry therein will not satisfy the calls of §270.79 and constitute
the judgment a lien.51 But the amendment added to §299.24(1) the fol-
lowing sentence: "Any such judgment shall be a docketed judgment for
all purposes upon payment of a fee of 50 cents to the clerk." The effect
of this sentence is not clear. Presumably it has the effect of making the
case docket a judgment docket at least for those cases where the 50c is
paid.
Section 299.24(2) contained and still contains the originally proposed
procedure for docketing a transcript of a small claims judgment in circuit
court, requiring a $2 fee to the clerk in accordance with §59.42(8) (b).
The same result is now obtained by paying 50c to the clerk to effect
docketing in county court. To this extent each county now has a dual
docket system, and the record searcher must examine the small claims
case docket for judgments and to determine if the 50c has been paid.
This is no greater burden in Milwaukee County, but it has caused dis-
satisfaction in the rest of the State, as well it should.
because of the inapplicability of that term in ch. 299 practice, as to which see
discussion, infra. The text of §299.24 in the 1961 statute book is not current,
and attorneys should not rely upon getting notice from the clerk of the entry
of orders.
48The several special acts creating inferior and municipal courts and providing
for docketing of their judgments in circuit court need not be cited. Wis.
STAT. §254.17 (1959), provided for such docketing of the judgments of small
claims courts.
49 Wis. LAws 1951, ch. 168, §25.1.
50 Ibid.D
51 For the requirements of a judgment docket see Wis. STAT. §270.74 (1961).
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The Judicial Council's 1963 proposal 2 calls for: (1) the abolition
of the 50c practice and a return to the old system; and (2) a reduction
from $2 to $1 in the fee to be charged by the clerk for docketing a
transcript in circuit court.
Whatever besides sentiment for the old Civil Court may be the
merit of the dual system, the present statute is not an answer. It is not
clear why the two dockets in Milwaukee cannot be merged, particu-
larly since they are both maintained by the same clerk's office under
court reorganization. But the rest of the state should not suffer, and
the amendment, if not passed before this article appears should be
passed, with a proviso, if necessary, permitting Milwaukee to keep its
two dockets.
4. Reopening Default Judgments; Appeals from Defaults. In its
present form Ch. 299 is silent on the time within which a default judg-
ment may be reopened. Therefore, Title XXV practice applies,53 and
the defendant may have one year within which to move.54 In line with
the philosophy that small claims practice be more summary and that
proceedings be more speedily terminated, the Judicial Council has rec-
ommended the creation of §299.29 which would limit the time for such
a motion to 90 days in ordinary civil actions and to 20 days in ordi-
nance violation actions. 55 The section would, in addition, prohibit ap-
peals from default judgments, presently authorized by §299.30(1) with
leave of the appellate court, because such appeal is a useless procedure,
review under §299.30 being on the record.
The proposed section eliminates useless procedure and accomplishes
a worthy objective in speeding the finality of small claims judgments.
It should be adopted. 56
5. Mail Service; Failure of Actual Notice; Reopening. Under
present §299.14, discussed above, there is no time limit upon the re-
opening of a default judgment obtained upon mail service where the
defendant contends and proves that there was a failure of actual notice.
Defendant must move "within 15 days of receiving actual knowledge,"
but the time of receipt of such knowledge might be years after the entry
fo judgment, and, considering only §299.14, defendant would still be
entitled to move.
The relationship between this section, proposed §299.29, and §269.46
should be resolved. The latter sections, discussed immediately above,
52 Supra note 40.
53 WIs. STAT. §299.04 (1961).54 WIs. STAT. §269.46 (1961).
55 Supra note 40.
56 A corollary problem is presented in the relationship of §299.14 (reopening
default judgments for failure of actual notice where service is by mail), and
the question is whether the time limits of §269.46 or proposed §299.29 apply
to such an application, §299.14 containing no time limit from entry of judg-
ment within which the defendant must move.. See discussion, infra.
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apply generally to reopening default judgments. If §299.29 is adopted,
we will have a 90 day rule in all but ordinance violation cases; if not,
the one year granted by §269.46 will continue to apply. Do these sec-
tions apply to reopening under §299.14? Ch. 299 is silent on the sub-
ject. There would be more reason for inferring that the one year pro-
vision of §269.46 applies, because a mere 90 day period makes a pretty
hollow right out of §299.14. But if §299.29 is passed, §269.46 will be
no part of small claims practice, and we will be faced with the issue in a
very practical way. The issue should be resolved by legislation and not
left to the courts as a problem in statutory construction.
It is submitted that 90 days is too short a time limit for reopening
under §299.14; but, on. the other hand, the legislature should set a time
limit because every judgment worth entering deserves finality at some
time. If we will not accord finality to mail judgments, then it seems
we don't trust mail service and the whole concept should be scrapped.
6. Disnissal of Pending Actions Where Issue Not Joined. A rule
of court adopted in the seven southeast counties and pertaining to small
claims practice provides:
Where an action shall be held open, the adjournment shall be
to a day certain not more than 6 months from the date of the
order. An additional adjournment may be granted only if a writ-
ten stipulation of settlement, with alternative judgment provision
incorporated therein, is filed. If the case shall not be disposed of
on or prior to the adjourned date, the clerk shall place the same
upon the adjourned day calendar for disposition. If the case is
not otherwise disposed of it will be dismissed. Attorneys or liti-
gants will not be notified of the approach of the dismissal date.
The rule arises from the old practice of "holding open" which pre-
vailed in Milwaukee Civil Court. On the return day, plaintiff, with an
installment settlement made or in prospect, would "hold the case open,"
which meant that it was adjourned without joinder of issue and with-
out specific date, to be placed later on the clerk's own motion on a dis-
missal calendar (usually within about 6 months). If plaintiff had then
received his money, he could let the action be dismissed; if not he could,
by application to the clerk, get the matter "held open" again.
Feeling that the practice was disruptive of calendaring and the
orderly disposition of actions, the county judges, after court reorgani-
zation, adopted the current rule, which, in effect, gives the plaintiff one
"hold open," unless he can get a written settlement stipulation with
defendant, providing for alternative entry of judgment upon default.
The rule may be laudible as applied to the average case, but this writer
at least has found it unduly oppressive in specific instances. The curi-
osity is that there does not appear to be one word in Ch. 299 or Title
XXV which would authorize a rule of this type, and, applied to a given
19631
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
hardship case, its enforcement could well constitute an abuse of the
discretion to grant adjournments found in §299.27(2).
To give the court the necessary power to police its calendar, the
Milwaukee committee has proposed and the legislature has passed57
§299.225, providing:
The court may without notice dismiss any action or proceed-
ing, in which issue has not been joined, which is not otherwise
disposed by judgment or stipulation and order within 6 months
from the original return date.
At least the court has jurisdiction to exercise discretion, and it is to be
hoped that the passage of the statute will not result in the continuance
of an inflexible rule. But the difficulty is in the terminology "not other-
wise disposed (of) by judgment or stiplation and order." The phrase
obviously includes a stipulation and order of dismissal or settlement
stipulation with alternate judgment provision as mentioned in the court
rule, but what else does it include? Just as "holding open" is a concept
foreign to statutory practice, so is the concept of "disposal." It is just
too general; and it may be expected that counsel will devise all sorts of
ingenious "stipulations and orders of disposal" to avoid dismissal. How-
ever much language of greater precision might be indicated, it does
appear that (1) the court may refuse to sign an order "of disposal"
which does not "dispose," and (2) at least some discretion is provided
by the section.
F. NEW TRIALS; APPEALS
1. New Trials. New trials may be granted upon the traditional
grounds, including newly discovered evidence, under §299.28.
2. Appeals. 12-man jury cases are appealed to the Supreme Court
under Ch. 274.58 In other cases appeal is governed by §299.30. The
policy of the act is to prevent delay by intermediate appeals from or-
ders, and therefore at present the only appeals are from the judgment 9
or from an order denying a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. 60 Appeal is to the circuit court and is upon the record.6 It
must be taken within 20 days of the date of mailing notice of entry of
the judgment. 62
It is considered that the rule should be relaxed to permit appeals
from orders (1) denying a petition to reopen under §299.14 after fail-
ure of actual notice where service is by mail; denying a new trial under
any provision of §299.28; and (2) denying the reopening of a default
5 Wis. LAWS 1963, ch. 37.
58 WIS. STAT. §299.30(2) (1961).
s59 ris. STAT. §299.30 (1961) (including at this writing appeals from defaultjudgments with leave of the appellate court, an anamoly discussed below).
60 WIs. STAT. §299.28(2) (1961).
61 Wis. STAT. §299.30 (1961).
62 Ibid.
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judgment (instead of the useless appeal on the record from the de-
fault now authorized by §299.30(1). The Judicial Council bill 3 would
accomplish this extension of appeal.
There is a great deal of sympathy for the position that all appeals
should be to the Supreme Court, regardless of the amount involved.
Those favoring that procedure argue that the county court provides a
competent tribunal; that another trial court should not be involved with
reviewing the determinations of the county court; and that if a matter
is worth appealing, it is worth appealing to the Supreme Court. The
main argument contra is an economical one; namely, that small claims
cases simply do not warrant the expense of Supreme Court appeal for
initial review. Present §299.30 has produced the rather unusual situa-
tion of small claims judgments being entitled to double appellate re-
view, once in circuit and once in the Supreme Court, whereas all other
judgments are reviewable only through appeal to the Supreme Court.
However incongruous this may be, it does appear that there is a
great deal of merit in providing inexpensive, local review of small
claims judgments. In the final analysis, the existing practice is an exam-
ple of the result naturally flowing from a court system providing two
levels of trial courts. The justifiaction for the system must be in proce-
dures such as §299.30. Logic aside, and purely from a practical point
of view, it would appear that we should retain circuit court review of
small claims judgments, simply on the ground that a party is entitled to
review, and where a small amount is involved he should be able to get
it cheaply.
G. COURT RULES AFFECTING SMALL CLAIMS PRACTICE
Just prior to the January 2, 1962, effective date of court reorgani-
zation, the county courts of the seven southeastern counties above men-
tioned adopted a set of court rules designed to implement Ch. 299 prac-
tice. Several of these rules have been discussed throughout this article;
others of importance not previously mentioned are at this point quoted
in the footnotes. 4
63 Supra note 40.
64 The more important of the rules not previously mentioned are:
Rule 3, requiring that the summons must be filed at least 4 days before
the return date, preserving a provision in the old Milwaukee Civil Court
Act, §15.3, designed to permit orderly calendaring.
Rule 10 providing for exchange of process and remission of fees by af-
fidavit and order of court, as in the case of spoiled or unused process previ-
ously issued in blank.
Rule 13 requiring that motions be filed at least 4 days before the time
for hearing, likewise to permit orderly calendaring.
Rule 16 providing for the correction of non-jurisdictional errors (i.e.
violation of Rules 3 or 13 above) by order to show cause returnable at least
8 days from service, by ex parte order or by stipulation, preserving an old
practice of the Milwaukee Civil Court.
Attention is directed to the published rules (supra note 19) for other
regulations applying to ch. 299 practice.
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CONCLUSION
It is hoped that the above will be of aid as a guide to small claims
practice, as an explanation of the more important 1963 amendments
both adopted and proposed at this writing, and as a discussion of those
areas where further improvement is indicated. As the years go by, other
problem areas will undoubtedly develop, but, viewing the overall pic-
ture, it does appear that Ch. 299 in the main provides and efficient and
workable system for small claim disposition within the framework of
traditional judicial procedure, at the same time providing where neces-
sary those summary short-cuts which insure that in small cases justice
will not be denied through entanglement in unnecessary procedure. It
might be observed in closing that, when Ch. 299 has been given an op-
portunity to jell and the bugs have been worked out, some considera-
tion should be given to extension of this practice, at least on an optional
basis, into the area of cases just above the $500 mark, for it would seem
that a perfected Ch. 299 procedure might lend itself admirably to the effi-
cient disposition of many types of routine cases in that dollar category.
